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THE BASES OF DIVORCE.
JOHN LISLE.

Today, when questions concerning divorce are bruited about by
all sorts and conditions of men and by women as well, who seem to
feel that their interest is much the greater, we should consider the
question from the standpoint of fundamental principles. A thorough
knowledge of a problem is the fundamental basis for all reformative
work. Let us see what is the object sought. In our country, the
great outcry apparently is for uniform divorce laws.1 But it may
be doubted if uniformity per se is the aim of more than an infinitesimal
percentage of those who enlist in this reform. They want uniform
divorce laws, so that the laws of such or such a state may be changed
-they would grasp
"the sorry scheme of thing entire
And mould it nearer to their heart's desire."
This statement may seem unjust to those members of the bar and the
laity, whose only object is to destroy the conflict of laws on this subject, because so much anguish, chagrin, and shame are caused by the
decisions of those of our states that refuse to recognize divorce secured
in another. But, as we have suggested, a large number of the champions of this movement are sailing under false colors to the extent
that uniformity per se would not satisfy them. Thus, the question,
involved in this propaganda, is largely the old question of the ethical
justice of divorce, which has divided Europe into two camps at least
since the days of Imperial Rome.
Changes tending to restrict divorce are advocated. And it is particularly because of this advocacy that we think a thorough examination of
the bases of marriage should be made in order to adjust the law to meet
the psychological, sociological, and ethical (to say nothing of the economic) needs of the present age. We speak with precision when we say
such a study is an especial pre-requisite of change.
"There is nothing so good, however; that it cannot be made better, and it
is proper from time to time to take a survey of the law, or at least of some of
-Mr. Lisle graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1905, and the
University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1910; Secretary of the Pennsylvania
Branch of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology; Translator of Miraglia's "Comparative Legal Philosophy"; Del Vecchio's "The Formal Basis of Law"; Vanni's "The Positive Philosophy of Law"-the three foregoing for the Modern Philosophical Series-and Callise's History.
'We have used the term "divorce" throughout this article to denote an absolute legal. dissolution of the marriage relation, subject, however, to conditions
imposed by the court, such as the prohibition of marriage with the corespondent
or within a certain time.
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its departments, in order to determine what changes should be made for its improvement. At the outset, however, it should be admitted that the burden of
proof rests upon the advocate of change. Quieta non movere is a safe maxim.
Mere alteration of the old order is an error unless the new is obviously better.
Mere motion, change of position, is not necessarily progress.
"A man whose horse runs away with him is assuredly progressing, but progTessing to a smash-up rather than to safety. Better stand still for awhile, make
up your mind where you had best go, and then move quietly on with your steed
under control. I yield to no man in my reverence for antiquity. But just as a
thing is not necessarily better because it is new, so it may not be the best because
it is old."'

The precipitate and unconsidered tendency to change the law is
one of the worst features of the American legislation of today. As
Judge Gest continued:
"There is also great danger in changes suggested which are based on a
priori theory. This was Bentham's grand error. With next to no practical experience he never hesitated to advocate fundamental changes in the law without
any clear vision of their practical sufficiency for the purpose intended. He would
sit down with a light heart to advise the Portuguese nation upon the revision of
their constitution (Bowring Ed., VIII482), or the Spanish Cortez as to their
proposed Penal Code (VIII-487), or to draft a code for the judicial system of
France (IV-287), or to formulate securities against misrule adapted to a Mohammedan State for the assistance of the Pasha of Tripoli (VIII-555), or to
,favor President Madison with a few thoughts on codification (IV-452), or to
sketch the leading principles of a constitutional code for any state (11-267) as
if you could organizfe a government with a set of printed blanks."'

Thus it is that many advocates of reformation of the divorce laws
act. They take no thought of conditions or circumstances affecting
the underlying causes which give rise to the desire for divorce. They
do not see that law should fit conditions and not be a superimposed
structure. They would alter law without regard to the circumstances
which it is to govern. They have no idea of the continuous fluctuation of conditions.
"The alteration of the law is analogous to the movements of the rudder of
a ship sailing among the waves and tides and cross currents of social needs. If
the sea were still and the winds unwavering the sailors might set a straight
course and lash the rudder in a fixed position, but this is not our case. We do
not and cannot voyage in a straight line, and on clear days we must make a
fresh observation and set our course anew.''

This plan is either to carve an a priori theory or to adopt the law of some
foreign place or of another age.
Neither plan involves a study of local or temporal conditions.
To quote Judge Gest again:
"A kindred caution should be observed in copying legislation from other
jurisdictions. It does not follow that because a law or system of laws works
well in some places, that it is suitable to others, and there is need of even
greater caution when the legislation is novel in character and a sufficient time
has not elapsed in which to estimate fairly its advantages and defects. Let other
2"Suggestion for the Amendment of the Laws of Descendents Estates in
Pennsylvania, an address by Hon. John Marshall Gest, of the Orphans Court of
Philadelphia, before the Law Assn. of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, 1912, p. L"

'Ibid. p. 3.
'Ibid. p. 2.
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nations or states make their costly experiments while we watch and wait.
experinentium itt corpore vili."5

Fiat

Let us now state our problem briefly. It is to study all the conditions and circumstances of every kind and character which enter
into or affect the status of matrimony, in order to determine the regulations and provisions, which will make for the full development of
the contractors, individually and as a family. In the case of the family
relation, of course, the children are to be considered, since upon them
will depend the well-being and development of the society of which
they form a part. The last phase may be tautological, inasmuch as
the full development of the individual and of the family is possible
only in a fully developed state. These conditions we will take up in
this article only in the abstract, in an endeavor to show not the conditions at any certain time and place, but the subjects to be studied
for the determination of divorce legislation, and the results of the
ignorance or disregard of such conditions. To reach our end, we
must look into the psychological, ethical, and social bases of matrimony. We will, if possible, deduce from these the ideal, towards'
which humanity tends, and will discover the aid that its attainment
secures through laws that are psychologically, ethically, and socially
adapted to the ideal.
In the family, which is the subject of marriage laws, there are
two relations, the conjugal and the parental. And while we here consider the former directly, the latter is involved also. . The psychological foundation of matrimony is love. This sentence is not the practical effusion that it may seem. It has been developed by one of
the greatest Italian jurists and philosophers of the last century.
"Love the cause of matrimony, is not the winged child of the myth, otherwise the conjugal union would be fleeting; neither is it the impulse to the production of the beautiful in a beautiful mind and body, as Plato believed, because
this would deprive it of the natural tendency to generation, and furthermore in
this case, it could exist between individuals of the same sex. Love is rather the
inclination of the senses, an affection,-a desire untrammelled by reason. This
fleeting appetite is raised to an enduring sentiment, to a constant 'will becoming
a duty, and existing in fidelity and mutual sacrifice. Here, as elsewhere, it is
the mind which makes the elements of the senses necessary and keeps them true.
Plato did not thoroughly understand the nature of love on another score, for he
allows polygamy, while true and living love is a feeling that will not brook it.
Aristotle, on the other hand, had a true conception of love, calling matrimony
the union exclusive, lasting, and divine, which results from the interpenetration
of the two opposite characters of man and woman. Such a conception was common to the minds of the Roman jurisconsults, who defined matrimony as conjunctio mars et foeminae, consortium omnis vitae, divini et humani ]urs coinmunicatio, and as conjunctio r'iri et nulieris individuam vitae consuetudinen continuens. Hegel is right when he says that Kant presents matrimony in its shamesex for the
lessness, in his definition of it as a bond of persons of different
'
interchange and constant possession of mere sexual pleasures.'
'Ibid. p. 3.
GMiraglia, "Comparative Legal Philosophy" (Boston, 1912), p. 668.
32
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In other words, marriage is founded on love, "an enduring sentiment-a constant will." Further, it is a complete personal union oi
the physical, mental, and spiritual phases of personality.
"The spirtual element should respond to the spiritual, the physical to the
physical, so that the man and the woman are bound together by a three-stranded
rope of soul, mind, and body. In the sentence, erunt tuo in carne una, the first
phrase, erunt tuo, expresses this individuality and the impossibility of the fusion
of two personalities; the other, "in carne una," expresses the unity of life.
And now it must be remembered that the union of the sexes is a vital, not a
mere physical union, though in the physical act the two fundamental sentiments
of the individuals seem to become one.."'

From this we can see that a true, ideal marriage is a life-long contract
based on a life-long love, resulting in a complete union of two personalities in their triplex quality. We can see also from this that in
fact there -isno real marriage when these qualities are not present,
and that a marriage is non-existent in fact when any one of these
elements is lacking. Law has nothing to do with it. It can refuse
to recognize its non-existence or cessation, but this does not make the
so-called marriage a true and actual fact. The most it can do is to
refuse recognition of the catastrophe on grounds of public policy or
morality. Before going into the question of the adequacy or legitimacy of the grounds for such legal action, we must absolutely recognize
it as without effect on the world of fact. Law cannot make a status, it
can only entail upon certain acts, parol, written or defacto, the consequences of which, the status, if existing in fact, bring about. To quote
Miraglia again:
"The truth is that, when divorce makes its appearance the real -union has
ceased. It is not the violent destruction of marriage, but the legal end of a
union, which no longer exists in fact."'

To understand this distinction and to comprehend fully that divorce
is only the legal recognition of a fact is essential to a complete comprehension of the problem that confronts us. We must look upon it
not as the destruction of a fact, but as its recognition. This is the
first step t6wards a true understanding of the status of matrimony.
And, without a true understanding of the object under examination
no examination can lead to an increase of knowledge.
The second step towards a true understanding of the problem
of divorce is to recognize it, not as a good per se, but as a remedy for
an unavoidable evil. This is, of course, a corollary to our proposition,
that divorce is a recognition of an unfortunate falling short of the
ideal. It follows so closely upon the proposition itself that we need
hardly discuss it. If marriage should be a life-long triplex union of
two personalities, and divorce is a legal recognition of the actaal non7Miraglia, Ibid. p. 669.
'Ibid., p. 701.
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existence or cessation of such a union, on grounds of public policy,
it follows that divorce is a remedy to avoid as many as possible of
the evil consequences of a disordered state. It cannot be upheld logically or rationally as a good per se. And yet it has been so held by
advocates of no mean ability. These advocates have been the members of the socialist fraternity, who have been led into anarchistic
destructivism through observation of the existing evils of property.
Since women once were little 'better than chattels, these enthusiasts
advocate divorce as a step towards free marriage, which they endorse
as the destruction of one kind of individual ownership. Their error
is here apparent, the present status of married women is far from
that of a slave and monogamy is not a form of private property, but
a rational and ethical form of co-operation and associaton.
With our question thus stated, we can now consider divorce as
one of the regulations and provisions which will make for the full
development of the contractors of marriage, individually and as a
family, in which latter relation the children are considered, with due
regard to the well being and development of the society, of which
they form a part. We will consider divorce as a regulation that tends
to remedy as many as possible of the evil consequences of an unperfected
marriage. It is only thus that divorce can be given a rational basis.
But, the question thus put is complicated by many incidents. Marriage
is ideally indissoluble; of this, there is no doubt. But, human frailty
is such that at the present day and in the present state of development, this ideal id not generally possible of attainment. Human evolution, however, is constantly tending that way. Taking the question
of the advisability of divorce from an internal point of view, so to
speak, our first problem is: does divorce, the legal recognition of the
non-existence of the union, make for or against the attainment of the
ideal? The answer to this question is too often made from prejudce
and not from reason. The question is not one that can admit of a
universal answer, each race or nation reacting differently. But, the best
opinion seems to be that a well-ordered divorce law is not a hindrance to
development. The fact that immorality has increased and national life
degenerated, where divorce has been free is not in point. The causal
order is reversed in such a statement. It has been the luxury and extravagance of looseness of morals that has warped national life and resulted in the enactment of divorce laws which have not been remedial;
laws, that is, that have not formed the legal recognition of the actual nonexistence of marriage, but have, ofi the other hand, reflected the popular
acceptance of concubinage and the absence of a juridical sense of mar34
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riage. It is immorality which makes divorce a harbinger of immorality
within the family, a means to license, an incentive to the prostitution
of marriage; and not divorce per se that leads to such evils. Of
course, when immorality exists, divorce, preverted from its remedial
quality, is a defacto means for the realization of immoral ends. As
Mi-raglia writes:

"The morality of a nation depends on many causes among which must be
placed divorce and separation. But in combination with many different causes
it is impossible to determine what influence each factor bears to the resultant
state of morality."'

Yet is safe to say that divorce was never the initial cause.
"All these evils will develop, threatening to undermine the family and society, if divorce comes to be looked upon as a new form of freedom, which can
be availed of as any other. A people which has such a conception of divorce
is in a state of moral decadence, no longer understanding the worth of marriage or of ethical relationships. With them divorce will aid the work of corruption, and hasten their ruin. The Romans were corrupt when they began to
avail themselves of the rights of repudiation and divorce as means for the attainment of their individual wishes falling into the excesses of which history tells us.
In Fiance, too, in the past century, morality was at a low ebb, and the law considered divorce as a result of the great principle of freedom. The Assembly allowed divorce upon the desire of either husband or wife, for incompatibility of
temper. The Convention gave more rein, abolishing the prohibition of remarriage
within a year after the declaration of divorce by mutual consent, and allowed
divorce for six months desertion. Matrimony was, therefore, a status to be
proved, as it is among the savage tribes; the Convention itself was forced to repeal its decrees which had produced infinite scandals. But if divorce is not a
new form of freedom, but rather an enforcement of conjugal duties, social
morality, far from being lessened, may be strengthened by it. The fear of divorce
in uncorrupted ages, with people of deep rooted customs will insure the fulfillment of conjugal duties, and make divorce a remedy of little frequency. It
has been shown that divorce can co-exist with good morals and not affect them:
take the example of ancient Rome for hundreds of years. It was allowed in
England for many years, and was rare'

We may, therefore, assert that divorce per se, as a remedy, does
not tend to retard the attainment of the ideal. As far as intern&2
reasons go, we may uphold divorce.
We must now take up the reasons, contra-distinguished from the
causes of divorce. The first of these is, that it is not ethical to enforce
as a contractual duty the heroism needed to keep up the appearances
of married life, when respect has been destroyed by the total disregard of all marital duties upon the part of the other contractor. As
Mfiraglia says many crimes are the result of this stand upon the part
of legislators. It is not wise nor just to put a heavier weight upon
persons than they can bear. No ethical or social good is effected by
forcing men to crimes in an effort to realize an ideal beyond their
power of attainment.
"If divorce were not possible, the evil would be great. It would be a
cause of concubinage, and of the increase in the number of illegitimate births.
Sometimes, too, the nominal bond which remains increases the dishonor of the
9

Miraelia, Ibid. p. 705.
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innocent party, since it imposes upon him, if rich, a duty of paying with a brave
mien for the continual and irremedial infidelity of the other. The prosecution

for adultery allowed by law is of no useful service, since no one cares to become
ridiculous by a lawsuit, to enforce a possible imprisonment of a few months to a
year. Cases are not lacking, too, when murder has been the result; and not
rare are the acquittals upon the plea of the unwritten law. In other cases, suiide brings an end to suffering which the victim cannot bear. When the system
of separation prevails, the children find their parents living in illicit unions, a
fact which endangers the respect which they should bear towards the authors of
their days."11

This is no exaggeration. On the score of the general balance of
criminality, therefore, divorce seems to be advisable. And we can again
cast our vote with the "ayes."
Thus, divorce from a positive point of view seems to be allowable as a remedy, because it tends to lessen the number of crimes in
general, and because it does not hinder man's development towards
the ideal of perfect marriage.
Let us now consider the negative point of view; that is, give due
weight to the evils of divorce, and consider means of lessening them
if they do not turn the scale in favor of non-divorce.
That divorce has evils in a fact too often seen to need a word of
comment. We may say, however, that it need not be so black as it
is painted. In the first place, we must again refer our reader to our
main proposition; divorce is only the legal recognition of an actual
evil. It should not be blamed, therefore, for the evils resulting from
the fact of which it is only the recognition, but only for the evils
resultant upon such recognition. These evils must be weighed with
those resultant upon non-recognition, and the balance noted.
These evils in regard to the parties themselves, but not from their
standpoint are given by Miraglia as ihree. 'In the event of a divorce,
"Society would be forced often to submit to the scandal of the marriage
of the divorced and culpable party with the person who was the cause of his
fault. For the statutes forbidding this are useless because of the legal uncertainty of the adultery. In the second place, it cannot be in accord with the sentiments of civilized nations that a .woman who has been the wife of a man still
alive should be the wife of another, or that a man should be the husband of
two women, both of whom are still alive. In the third place, it is not an unfounded fear that divorce will be obtained for causes prepared, with malice prepense, by those who wish without cause to break the marital yoke. Acts of
severe injustice, cruelty, and desertion will be committed with the secret intention of forcing a divorce. Cases will not be impossible where husbands will
for their wives' unfaithfulness in order to gain a divorce and
make opportunities
12
remarriage."

The first and third of these evils are to a large extent unavoidable,
but with time and the cure-all of publicity, their occurrence may be
lessened. And, it is a bad rule to inflict a known harm, as shown in
our positive arguments, because of the possible abuse of the remedy.
lIMiraglia, Ibid. p. 702.
1I2 bid., p. 704.
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The -second is not in accord with the nicest feeling, but in America
such marriages have been accepted without scandal. And, to go back
to our main proposition again, divorce is not a good per se, but a
remedy at best. A makeshift to cover an actual evil; the scandal of
illicit relation; a scandal for which it is actually an effective substitute.
Thus, divorce from a negative standpoint, that is, with all its
evils accepted as real and existent, seems to be allowable, as a remedy,
because it substitutes such evils for others of greater weight.
Divorce, however,- has a direct effect upon the children of the
marriage or marriages, which cannot be neglected in the consideration
of the question. The interests of the children of the first marriage,
however, are largely analogous to those of the public at large. Although much more intimately and with a greater liability to harm
because of their ages and of their receptive attitude, they are subject
to the same evils. The evils of divorce and non-divorce bear in their
regard the same proportion, though increased in weight, and the scale,
therefore, falls on the same side. There is one point, however, wherein
their position differs; in their dependence. This point we will consider from the economic point of view, as one of the complications of
divorce. It must be remembered in justification of our statement that
the children of the first marriage are in the position of the public at
large, that we, in America, see only the evils of divorce, not the evils
of non-divorce. In- other words, the position of the children of divorced parents is constantly before us, and their position is compared
with that of children whose parents continue to live together, or who
are separated, and we conclude that divorce per se is bad. This comparison, however, is not fair, as a moment's reflection will show.
The position of X, Y, and Z, the children of divorced parents, must
be compared with the position they would occupy if their parents had
not taken the remedial step. It is not fair to compare it with the
position of A, B, and C, whose parents' estrangement was not complete, ex hypothesi. In order to get a clear view, we must keep in
mind that the parents of the latter have not found their relation iimpossible, no matter how difficult it may be, and that divorce is a
remedial recognition of the impossibility of the union, not a means for
the shifting of a difficult burden, as thus only can it be upheld. The
children of the second marriage are in a difficult position to consider.
We can, of course, state without proof that their position is infinitely
preferable to illegitimacy. Such a comparison is not possible. But,
approximating such a problem, we can advance two arguments which
make for the allowance of divorce. We may here say by way of
37
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parenthesis that by divorce we mean the absolute rescission of thu
marriage bond, with full liberty to remarry, under certain definite
restrictions as to time and person. The question of legal separation
we will take up later. The two reasons which favor the freedom to
remarry, with reference to the children of the second marriage, are:
(1) the interests of the public in the procreation of legitimate children, and (2) the fact that children must be considered in two lights:
the ultimate light of their own personalities, wherein we have waived
argument, and in their medial relation to the happiness of their parents, whose philogenic instinct must be given weight. We must, therefore, conclude, from the weight of evidence attainable, that there is
no such injustice to the children of the second marriage as to furnish grounds for the denial of divorce, and that the position of the
children of the first is not made worse by the use of such a remedy.
We must now say a word in favor of divorce as a remedy with
regard to the participants--for:
"It must not be forgotten that social interests, and conventions should not
destroy an individual right, as the latter should not be raised above social rights.
In this case, as in others like it, the two terms tend rationally to the harmony
which comes from looking upon the state as an ethical organism. A state would
be a single physical or naturai organism, in which the part lives the life of the
whole if it is absorbed in its eminent right, the rights of the individuals, which
have their own personality, and realize the idea of man in one of his branches!"13

So, Miraglia states the right of the individuals to have a recognition of their needs given them, proportioned to a recognition of
the rights of society. Accepting the fundamental presupposition of
philosophy, it follows that divorce from a personalistic standpoint is
a remedial right due them. No legal obstacles be raised against such
individuals because of preconceptions or prejudices on the part of the
legislators, without due regard to the facts of the actual cessation or
non-existence of the marriage relation; and without an eye to their
needs, including the physical need of sexual relations, of support, and
of the physical and mental comforts of home life, the need of companionship, respect, honor, and the needs of encouragement, trust, and
confidence. When these have failed, it is injustice to deny the deceived and disillusioned party the opportunity to remedy his or her
mistake by beginning life again. The claim of the injured person may
be lessened by the rule Male electio est in culpa, but it is still a claim
which is entitled to due consideration. It is something added to the pro
side of the balance. And, when we consider the interest of society in having happy members, not subject to temptation to crime, the advantage of
the remedy to the parties themselves is conclusion in favor of divorce.
We can, therefore, in solution of our problem, state that we con' 8 Miraglia, Ibid. p. 702.
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sider divorce as one of the regulations that makes for the full development of the contractors of marriage, individually and as a family,
in which latter relation the children are considered; a regulation that
tends to remedy as many as possible of the evil consequences of the
actual cessation or non-existence of an alleged marriage; that lessens the tendency to crime, by doing away with the empty mask of a
relation, and by giving freedom in place of slavery, with the consequent enlarging of the field for development both personal and social.
We may here take up the question of conditional divorces. They
are unquestionably advisable to prevent the abuse of divorce as a
means of license instead of as a remedy. They have a sound basis in
that the logical rationality of divorce lies in its effective beneficial
tendency to the ethical well being both of the parties and of the community. Then there is a right to circumscribe it with conditions to
prevent not only its abuse but its use from unethical motives. The
most common condition to prevent its being a reward of immorality
is the prohibition of the marriage of the respondent and corespondent. Another condition of a purely precautionary nature is the prohibition of remarriage within a certain time. The object is to prevent an application for divorce, where longer consideration may show
that the marriage has not ceased in fact, or for heterogeneous reasons,
under the influence of an infatuation, which befogs the mind only
temporarily. Conditions, based on eugenics and hygiene, might well
be made in the case of remarriage in communities where the social
sense is not sufficiently developed to allow them for marriage in
general. The proof of disease is often given in divorce and the sense
of shame cannot be outraged by a prohibition where the disgrace has
already been held up to the public view. The right of the state to
prohibit marriage on such grounds cannot be doubted; it is denied
only by some jurists because its exercise necessitates an examination
which they think invades the sphere of personal freedom. It would
be well to remember that the sphere of personal freedom is not determined by its historical definition, but the logical determination of the
proportion, giving the greatest personal freedom to both contesting parties, their children and the community; the greatest freedom for full
self-realization without harm at the hands of one individual. Then it is
well to recall in considering the enactment of precise marriage laws, that
tend to legalize only those marriages, which, because they most closely
approximate to the ideal, will be less likely to prove non-existent in fact,
or to cease. But, to rehrn to our particular point, this alleged violation
of personal freedom can have no weight against the prohibition of re-
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marriage on the grounds of disease, as has been argu6d, however irrationally, because the violation and exposure have been effected, and it is
merely a question of acting upon evidence already in court.
Before passing to incidental questions and some of the complications of divorce, we must say a word about separation. To our mind
separations are unjustifiable, as a substitute fQr divorce. They are
not fish, flesh, nor good red-herring. They are a recognition of incompatibility but are without remedial force. They prevent, it is
true, the wasting of the estate. By regulations of the financial relations, they enforce support, and they prevent personal abuse and
violence. But, to argue that, for these reasons they are preferable
to divorce, is merely to assert that non-divorce is preferable to divorce,
and that as a sop to Cerebus, we will enfranchise woman so that coverture will be no defense to crime, tort or civil injury. Separation, from
the personalistic standpoint, does not allow the .full development of the
parties to a non-existent marriage. It forces them to live in solitude,
without the opportunities and comfortable solace of companionship and
family. It is a protection, as we have said, from personal violence, abuse
and peculation, but is no substitute for divorce. It is more analogous to
the statutes against homicide, assault and battery, man-slaughter, embezzlement, and the laws governing guardians and trustees, than it is the
law governing status. It, in fact, enforces the recognition of the socalled marriage-non-existent in fact ex hypothesis-and attempts to
regulate it. This much for the individualistic standpoint, and this last
sentence shows without more ado, that separation is equivalent to non-divorce ina social aspect.
The question of divorce, however, is complicated on many sides
by ramifications resulting from the fact that the conjugal relation
is the basis of the family or the social unit. One of these complications, which is absolutely extrinsic, is the jurisdiction of the church.
This question is in its turn confused by the misunderstanding or misrepresentation of the problem. In"other words, the question of jurisdiction is not kept distinct from that of justice or rightness of divorce. As the champions of the uniformity of law among the American states, are often, as we have said not champions of uniformity,
per se, but of their own notions, so a large number of champions of
church control are affected by the fact that the churches are generally
against divorce. For, as far as the Catholic church is concerned its
attitude has been constantly against it.
the principle of
"The church from the beginning endeavored to inculcate
14
indiissolubility as better conforming to Christian beliefs.'
14Miraglia, Ibid. p. 705.
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But here we must restate our proposition briefly to make a further comparison clear. Divorce is right, but right only as a remedy.
We must, therefore, bear in mind that it is not right to favor church
control because civil marriages are dissoluble. This is making two
logical and scientific errors. First, it is unscientific in granting jurisdiction to a science, regardless of its fitness or capacity to investigate
and determine the question under consideration; because the answer
will be given through prejudice and preconception. We do not say
that the Church would so act, but we say that its attitude towards divorce
is unwise for these reasons. Conversely, the deprivation of jurisdiction
for the same reasons is equally unwfse. In the second place, it is illogical
to confuse divorce with the right of rescission of contract. If rescission
is wrong in marriage, the marriage contract cannot hold unless denial of
rescission applies by analogy to other contracts; this is fallacious. To take
up the latter reason first, we will recapitulate. The juridical ideal is
indissolubility, but divorce is a proper remedy for a marriage no
longer in existence. This does not deny the ideal of indissolubility.
In fact, divorce is allowed only upon proof that it does not tend to
retard the attainment of the ideal, through historical and evolutional
development. Any attempt, therefore, to show that law must allow
rescission of marriage, through the supposed equivalency of divorce,
the remedial recognition of the nonexistence of marriage and of the
right of rescission, presupposes ex hypothusi the fact of marriage is
insidious and founded on untruth. Rescission is immoral, unsocial
and unethical. These facts govern and necessitate the legal denial
of the right of rescission. The arguments in favor of it are bad.
The analogies of marriage to contract, involving the right to rescind,
and of indissoluble marriage to slavery involving an .ideal of indissolubility, are not well founded. Miraglia takes up these points in
the following passage, where we may add by way of introduction and
explanation, he uses the vexed term "natural law" to designate the
ideal goal of positive law.
"From the legal and civil point of view the orthodox doctrine can be followed

that consent is necessary for the creation of the contract, but not for its preservation. It can easily be held that consent is a necessary prerequisite of marriage,
which, however, must conform to natural laws and be absolute and irrevocable.
In this respect the subjective element should be subordinate to the objective. So
in contract law, it is not always true that the contractural acts depend upon consent. The jurists say, Qiuae ab initio sunt voluntatis, post factom stunt necessitatis, if society or third parties have an interest in the contract. Civil marriage
is not based on the principle of arbitrary and individualistic ethics. It is a result
of the conception of a lay state, and of liberty of conscience. In other words,
logic does not- prevent the civil marriage, and repudiates the theory of Grotius,
Puffendorf, and Thomasius. For Grotius, in his definition of marriage laid emphasis on the physical side, practically allowing for no difference between it and
concubinage. The difference, he says, is one of positive law: Concubinatium
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quemdam verum ac ratum esse conjugium etsi effectibus quibusdam julrs civilis
propiis privaten aut etiam effectus quosdam naturales impedimento legis civilis,
antittat. Puffendorf believed that matrimony, being consensual in origin,
was subject to all the laws of contract. Thomasius believed that indissolubility, conjugal fidelity, and marital authority are all parts of the conjugal
contract, and no consequents of the natural law. This ideal of indissolubility
should not be disregarded on the ground that law does not recognize contracts
which result in the abnegation of civil personality, for marriage is not a mutual
renunciation, but, on the other hand, it is the acquisition of a new status. Even
if a husband and wife make their two natures one, as Rosmini says, yet it is impossible for them to become one and to preserve distinct and inalienable individuality. In fact law protects their distinct personalities. The law does not recognize irrevocable contracts, implying a full or partial alienation of personality, but
without producing such alienation, create a higher order
recognizes those which,
of ethical relations."1 5
The question of jurisdiction also should be entirely free and distinct, and in every way untrammelled by the real question of divorce.
The object of or desire for jurisdiction may lie in the question of
divorce, but we should recognize that the decision on the question of
jurisdiction should not be affected by the probabilities of the different
decisions of the two courts-church and state. When this question
is thrown overboard,, we can approach that of jurisdiction philosophically. There is but one answer. The state must have jurisdiction in
marriage and divorce, because of the political, social, moral, juristic
and ethical quality of the relation. The strength of the state's
position lies in the fact that it is not opposed to the super-imposition
by the Church of whatever further injunction it may seem advisable
in the religious sphere. It merely demands the right to impose conditions within the spheres for which it is responsible, and it is primarily responsible for the political, social, moral, and legal, and
ethical well-being of its citizens or subjects. To quote Miraglia:
"Marriage is an ethical, religious, and legal institution. The church considered the sacrament as the essence of a conjugal union, and therefore claimed the
right to regulate it with its canons and in its courts. The state is not an atheistic
but a lay power. It has no authority in religious matters, and therefore cannot
look upon marriage except as a civil contract, sni generis, recognizing, however,
that the complete union is a divine bond. The incompetence of the state is not
due to ignorance of religion or the church, nor indifference to those high human
interests so vital and powerful. In the state there is contained and developed the
same human nature on which religion is based; but the state considers human
nature only from the juristic point of view. It should prevent the clergy inspiring
the multitude to rebellion or fanaticism, -but at the same time, it should not encourage the development of atheism. To look upon marriage as a civil contract
does not mean to lower it to the condition of a bargain and sale, partnership or
ordinary contract, in which there is great usefulness, or an exchange of value, but
it connotes the recognition of the perfect union of two persons of different sex.
Marriage, looked upon as a civil contract, has a distinct and particular nature in
its meaning and its end, and is essentially different from all other contracts. The
state, in the case of marriages, not only exercises its functions of guaranty, but
intervenes as an ethical power, an organ of natural law, and realizes the conception of matrimony, determines its conditions, taking account of the various his-

15Ibid., pp. 697-699.
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torical needs of the people. Consequently it cannot, as Trendelenburg would wish,
give over without abdication to the church the contract of marriages."16

Thus the right of the state to grant divorce is assured, while the
right of the Church to deny divorce within the religious sphere remains intact. In other words, divorce may even as a remedy be
wrong generally, which, of course, would be philosophically wrong,
but in this article we have used the word "philosophy" to cover all
the sciences save religion. It remains politically, socially, morally, juridically and ethically right, and therefore, should be allowed by the state.
As a practical question the state must keep account of matrimonial statistics, because of franchise and succession.
A word in passing may be said on a subject closely connected
with that of divorce-impediments to marriage. The true determination of these is one of the most important factors, in the question of
matrimonial law. For, when accurately determined with an eye to
circumstances and conditions, they make for the attainment of ideal
marriages, and when lax or unjustifiably stringent they bring about
the status whose legal recognition is divorce. The impediments generally recognized in America are minority, physical incapacity, mental incapacity, prior marriage and consanguinity. These are, of
course, impediments in fact, and make an alleged marriage void. The
proceedings for annulment are not so much to effect a change of
status as to record the old existing status. Their number can well be
increased, for example, today a movement is on foot requiring a clean
bill of health. This is a good move, and with the increase of knowledge and social sense in the community, we can prophecy its early
realization. On the Continent, many impediments are recognized,
which perhaps have outlived their usefulness, but, as so much of the
canon law, they show a good tendency to reflect juristically the efforts
of the people to avail themselves of juridical or any kind of scientific
knowledge. Thus, the betrothal, as a semi-juridical custom, entailing
many duties of an intimate nature, is a continental custom which
makes for the avoidance of many ill-timed unions. It might well be
legally enacted by requiring an interval between the issuance of the
license and the consummation of the marriage. Thus, a period of
trial would be effected, which would have as many as are practical
of the advantages of the trial marriage and would lessen the number of unions recognized by the state, in which one or more elements
of marriage, the triplex union of the physical, mental and spiritual
phases are lacking, and, hence, lessen the number of recognitions of the
actual non-existence of marriage, that is, of divorces. A moment's
16Ibid., pp. 674, 676.
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reflection will show that this precaution will have a more salutary effect than the refusal on the part of the state to recognize the mistake
when made, because it will show the error before the more serious
relation is entered.
Another question related to the question of divorce is that of the
right of ownership of property. There are several theories ranging
from the old theory, whereby the husband upon marriage became the
sole owner of everything, to the American theory, whereby both husband and wife retain and administer their own property. The intermediate theory of note does not affect the property, but gives the husband the right to administer, with an appeal to the courts by the wife
in case of his abuse of it. We can see that all these methods have
elements of destructive principles. But, the American system, entailing the greater freedom is undeniably the best and we can but
say that the status of. marriage should not be burdened with an arbitrary rule as to the property, which should be left to the determination of the individuals with the hope that their union may be suiciently true to tide them over this difficulty.
Another complex problem of divorce is the economic and financial
question. By this we do not mean that its present cost in America
is too large for the poor. This is a fact beyond dispute, which leads,
among our lower classes, especially among the negroes, to the evils
of a non-divorce regime, and subjects their morals to the adverse
criticism of sociologists. But we mean that divorce is an economic
dilemma, for which we can find no solution. In other words, what
can be done in the case where the husband is unable to meet the increased financial drag of two establishments. This question is one of
the most general application. It is neither restricted to the very
poor, nor to the case where he immediately remarries, nor is it solved
by the abolition of alimony (as in Pennsylvania in most cases), for
he must support his children. This question applies to the large
number of men in moderate circumstances, who can support.a family,
all members of which live under one roof, but who cannot adequately
support themselves and their wife and children living in two establishments. To allow a man, because he has made a mistake, however
real and serious, to throw the burden of it upon others is unjust and
unethical, as may be seen at a glance. Divorce, nor marriage itself,
for that matter, should be permitted to those who cannot bear its burdens.
And yet to make divorce depend upon proof of such ability is followed by
two great evils, one direct and one indirect. The direct evil lies in
the inequality created before the law. While this- may have more
44
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appearance than substance of injustice, yet it is not a situation to be
sought because it is a motive to social unrest, and because it is prohibitive of the remedy of divorce to many, thus placing them in an
actual non-divorce granting regime; in the midst of one, whose juridical institutions allow divorce. The inevitable result of this is misunderstanding and a division of society which should be homogeneous
into two camps in regard to a political, social, moral, juridical, and
ethical fact. In the second place, it is indirectly bad, because it puts
the state in the position of a guarantor of this ability-if proof of
this ability is a prerequisite of divorce. This has a bad effect, resulting
in one of two possibilities. If a proof of ability, a bcnd or the creation of a trust is required, the direct evil of this system is multiplied
by the increased number of men living on salary or as cestui quo
trustents, unable to furnish a large sum or obtain bonds.' If a proof
of income at the date of divorce is sufficient, and attachment or sequestration are relied upon to force his payment of support, the number of cases where payment vill be neglected through fraud or concealment of assets will put the state's "proof" to ridicule. It would
seem that there were no way to escape the trouble. Yet, we can only
look upon it as a complication of the divorce problem. As a negative argument it is vain, for the answer is simple; the family is no
better off in the circumstances without divorce, for the man may easily
spend his money otherwise than in support of his wife and children.
We can hope only that evolution of the social sense, accompanied
by the great panacea of publicity will enable the philosophical students of law to reach a conclusion on this matter, which will result in
the disappearance of the dilemma from the field of unsolved problems.
In conclusion we may hope that the philosophical dream of marriage may some day be attained, for in this matter, as in every other,
the philosopher has a theory and an ideal. He believes that men will
grow in time to take the relation with such true sense of its political,
social, moral, juridical and ethical importance that the recognition of
the cessation or non-existence of marriage may be left to the parties
themselves, who with certain formalities can divorce themselves, without the scandal of an action at law.
"Should divorce be allowed upon mutual consent? Montesquieu says that the
law establishes causes for divorce where incompatability is the clearest denial of
the absolute union of matrimony. In this case, mutual consent is not the cause
of the dissolution of the marriage, but is only the sign. It cannot be alleged that
the allowing such a cause of divorce is reducing marriage to a contract. It would
serve to hide the woes and shame of the home, it would avoid ridicule, and prevent the necessity of a legal accusation, which sometimes results in imprisonment.
But to ward off a series of abuses
fatal to matrimony, the law should surround it
with the greatest precautions."'I s
'SMiraglia, Ibid., p. 710.
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But until the ideal is realized we heartily commend a study of the
underlying causes of matrimonial shipwreck so that divorce may remedy
its ills, without hindering progress, and so that it may meet the demands
of social Iffe.

